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A Search Model of the Aggregate Demand
for Safe and Liquid Assets
Abstract
Safe and liquid assets, such as Treasury bonds, are money-like instruments that command a
convenience yield. We analyze this in a search model of two assets that dier in liquidity and safety.
In contrast to the reduced-form approach, which puts the safe and liquid asset in utility function,
we explicitly model investors' trading needs and the trading friction. One new implication from
this approach is that the marginal investor's preference for safety and liquidity is not enough in
determining the premium. Instead, the distribution of investors' preferences plays a direct role.
Our model implies that an increase in the supply of the liquid asset may increase or decrease the
liquidity premium, depending on the distribution of investors' liquidity preference. Our model
shows that investors may over- or underinvest in the search technology relative to a central planner,
and that overinvestment occurs when investors' expected trading frequency is in the intermediate
region.
JEL Classication Numbers: G11, G23.
Keywords: Convenience Yield, Safe and Liquid Asset, Search.
1 Introduction
There has been growing interest in the role of \safe and liquid assets" in a nancial system,
especially since the recent nancial crisis. One nding that emerges from these studies is that safe
and liquid assets, such as Treasury bonds, are like money, commanding a sizeable premium for their
safety and liquidity (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen 2012). What are the determinants of
this premium? How does the supply of Treasury bonds aect the premium? When risky assets
become more liquid, how does it aect their own prices, as well as the Treasury price? What is
the welfare implication when traders invest to improve the liquidity of risky assets?
One framework for addressing these questions is a representative agent model. For example,
Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) follow the tradition of money-in-the-utility-function
formulation (e.g., Sidrauski 1967) and include the Treasury holding in the representative investor's
utility function. In equilibrium, the liquidity premium is determined such that the representative
agent is indierent between holding the Treasury and a less liquid asset. That is, the representative
agent is the marginal investor whose indierence condition determines the liquidity premium.
The appeal of this approach is its simplicity, and one can analyze the liquidity premium without
explicitly modeling investors' trading needs and trading frictions.
We adopt an alternative framework, and explicitly model investors' trading needs and trading
frictions. Not only does this make it possible to directly connect liquidity premium to trading
frictions|it also leads to new implications that are absent in the representative agent framework.
Specically, the marginal investor's liquidity preference is no longer enough to determine the
premium. Instead, the distribution of investors' liquidity preferences also plays a direct role. For
example, we nd that an increase in the supply of Treasury bonds may increase or decrease their
liquidity premium, depending on the distribution of investors' liquidity preferences.
The intuition is as follows. Suppose assets 1 and 2 have identical cash ows, but asset 2 is
\more liquid" than asset 1. In the reduced-form approach, asset 2 being more liquid is modeled as
investors deriving a \convenience yield" from holding asset 2 (i.e., putting the holding of asset 2 in
an investor's utility function). Let P1 and P2 be the prices of assets 1 and 2, respectively. The liq-
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uidity premium, P2 P1, is determined by the present value of the marginal investor's convenience
yield. Hence, the marginal investor's liquidity preference fully determines the premium.
However, this is no longer the case once we explicitly take trading frictions into account.
Suppose that asset 2 is perfectly liquid, and that the friction for trading asset 1 is that investors
need to search in the market and can trade only when they meet their counterparties. In this
case, the marginal investor's liquidity preference cannot fully determine the premium. To see this,
suppose that P1 decreases by one dollar due to a reduction of demand from its investors. We will
see that, if the marginal investor between assets 1 and 2 remains the same, P2 will decrease by
less than one dollar, and hence the liquidity premium P2   P1 will increase. The reason is that
the marginal investor's value function is less sensitive to P1 than to P2: Intuitively, since asset 2
is perfectly liquid, P2 is the price at which an investor can transact right away. So, a one-dollar
drop in P2 leads to a one-dollar increase in his value function. In contrast, a one-dollar drop in P1
leads to a less-than-one-dollar increase in his value function. This is due to the trading friction:
P1 is the price at which the investor can transact only when he meets his counterparty. There
is a chance that the investor cannot nd his counterparty before his trading need disappears.
This point arises naturally once we explicitly account for the trading friction, but is absent in the
reduced-form approach that abstracts away from trading frictions.
In essence, the notion of \market price" is dierent in a setup where frictions are modeled
explicitly than in a setup that treats frictions implicitly. In a model which treats frictions only
implicitly, the market price is the price at which investors can transact at immediately. However,
this is not the case in models with explicit trading frictions.
We formalize the above intuition by extending the over-the-counter (OTC) market model of
Due, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005) by introducing two assets. In the baseline model, the two
assets are claims to identical cash ows but have dierent liquidity. Asset 1 (e.g., agency debt) is
less liquid, and trade occurs only when a buyer meets a seller. In contrast, asset 2 (e.g., Treasury)
is perfectly liquid and transactions occur without any delay. There is a continuum of investors,
whose trading needs are due to the changes of their valuations of the two assets. In particular,
when a type- investor receives $1 from asset 1 or 2, he derives a utility of 1 +. We normalize
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the region for investors' possible types to [0;]. An investor's type stays constant until the arrival
of a shock. Once the shock arrives, his new type is drawn from a random variable, which has a
density function of f() on [0;]. Investors' types are independent from one another. Hence, in
the steady state, f() is also the cross-sectional distribution of investors' types.
We show that, in equilibrium, there are two cuto points,  and , with 0 <  <  <
. Investors with high types (i.e.,  2 (;]) choose to buy asset 2, those with intermediate
types (i.e.,  2 (;)) choose to buy asset 1, and those with low types (i.e.,  2 [0;))
choose not to buy any asset. Investors  and  are marginal investors: investor- is
indierent between buying asset 1 and buying asset 2, while investor- is indierent between
buying asset 1 and not buying any asset.
The liquidity preference of the marginal investor between the two assets (i.e., ) aects
the liquidity premium, but, as explained earlier, it cannot fully pin down the liquidity premium.
We nd that the liquidity premium increases in  but decreases in . Intuitively, a higher
 means that trading delay is more costly for the investor. Hence, asset 2 commands a higher
premium. How does  aect the liquidity premium? Since investor- is the marginal investor
between investing asset 1 and not investing, holding everything else constant, a decrease in 
decreases P1. In response to this drop in P1, as noted earlier, P2 would decrease less than P1
does. That is, the liquidity premium P2   P1 increases when  decreases.
Our model implies that an increase in the supply of asset 2 may increase or decrease the
liquidity premium, depending on the distribution f(). Intuitively, when the supply of asset 2
increases, it attracts more investors with high , pushing down both  and . As noted
earlier, the liquidity premium increases in  but decreases in . In the case illustrated in
Panel A of Figure 1, for example, f() is signicantly larger than f(). That is, there are
many investors whose  is around , but very few investors around . When the supply of
asset 2 increases,  decreases signicantly, but  decreases only slightly. Hence, the impact
from  dominates, and the increase in the supply of asset 2 decreases the liquidity premium.
Similarly, in the case illustrated in Panel B of Figure 1, f() is signicantly lower than f().
The impact from  dominates, and the increase in the supply of asset 2 increases the liquidity
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premium.
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Figure 1: Distribution of liquidity preferences across investors f().
What are the empirical implications from this result? Suppose we interpret asset 2 as Treasury
bonds and asset 1 as agency bonds or highly rated corporate bonds. Then, it might be reasonable
to think this case is summarized by Panel A: a small fraction of investors have very high . For
example, commercial banks can use Treasury securities as collateral to issue checking accounts,
and hedge funds can use them as collateral for their derivative positions. For most investors,
however, their  is modest. In this case, the increase in Treasury supply decreases the yield
spreads between Treasury and highly rated bonds, as documented in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2012). On the other hand, if we interpret asset 1 as junk bonds and asset 2 as
bonds with investment-grades and above (e.g., investment-grade rated corporate bonds, agency
bonds and Treasury securities), the case is more likely to correspond to Panel B, where very
few specialized investors (such as hedge funds) are the marginal investors for asset 1 (i.e., f()
is small). With this interpretation, our model implies that the increase of the supply of bonds
with investment-grades and above increases the spread between junk bonds and investment-grade
bonds.
When the search friction in market 1 is alleviated, how does it aect P1 and P2? Our model
shows that it decreases P2, because when trading asset 1 is easier, asset 2 becomes relatively less
appealing. Moreover, the liquidity improvement in market 1 has a mixed eect on the price of
asset 1. Intuitively, when search becomes slower, sellers in market 1 are willing to accept a lower
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price to speed up their transactions. Similarly, buyers are willing to oer a higher price to reduce
their waiting time. Hence, the total impact is mixed, and depends on which side is more eager to
speed up the transaction.
Our welfare analysis on the investment in the search technology for market 1 shows that
investors may over- or underinvest relative to a central planner. The reason is that the investment
has two externalities. First, when an investor improves his search technology, it not only benets
himself, but also benets his potential trading partners. This leads to a free-riding problem and
underinvestment. Second, investment in the search technology helps more investors to execute
their trades, and so reduces the number of investors in the market, making it more dicult for all
investors to meet their counterparties. Investors don't internalize this negative externality and so
overinvest relative to a central planner. Hence, the tradeo between the two eects determines
whether investors over- or underinvest in their search technology. We nd that overinvestment
tends to occur when investors' expected trading frequency is in the intermediate region.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper belongs to the recent literature that analyzes OTC markets in the search framework
developed by Due, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005). This framework has been extended to include
risk-averse agents (Due, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2007)), unrestricted asset holdings (Lagos
and Rocheteau (2009)). It has also been adopted to analyze a number of issues, such as security
lending (Due, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2002)), liquidity provision (Weill (2007)), on-the-run
premium (Vayanos and Wang (2007), Vayanos and Weill (2008)), cross-sectional returns (Weill
(2008)), portfolio choices (Garleanu (2009)), liquidity during a nancial crisis (Lagos, Rocheteau,
and Weill (2011)), price pressure (Feldhutter (2012)), order ows in an OTC market (Lester,
Rocheteau, and Weill, (2014)), commercial aircraft leasing (Gavazza 2011), high frequency trading
(Pagnotta and Philippon (2013)), the roles of benchmarks in OTC markets (Due, Dworczak,
and Zhu (2014)), adverse selection and repeated contacts in opaque OTC markets (Zhu (2012)),
intermediation chains (Afonso and Lagos (2015), Hugonnier, Lester, and Weill (2014), Shen,
Wei, and Yan (2015)), trading network structure (Neklyudov (2014)), as well as the interaction
5
between corporate default decision and liquidity (He and Milbradt (2013)). Another literature
follows Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) to analyze the liquidity value of money. In particular, Lagos
and Wright (2005) develop a tractable framework that has been adopted to analyze liquidity and
asset pricing (e.g., Lagos (2010), Lester, Postlewaite, and Wright (2012), and Li, Rocheteau, and
Weill (2012), Lagos and Zhang (2014)). Trejos and Wright (2014) synthesize this literature with
the studies under the framework of Due, Garleanu, and Pedersen (2005).
Our paper is related to these studies, and one distinctive feature is our analysis of the supply
eect on the premium. Another insight from our model is the contrast between the reduced-form
approach and the search approach that explicitly accounts for trading frictions. This is parallel to
the point stressed in the classical search-theoretical model of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), which
emphasizes the importance of explicitly modeling the frictions that render money essential. This
idea has led to the so-called New Monetarist Economics, which emphasize that assets are valued
not only for their fundamentals (i.e., claims to consumption goods) but also for their liquidity|
the extent to which they facilitate exchange in an imperfect market (see Williamson and Wright
(2010, 2011) for recent surveys).
2 The Model
Time is continuous and goes from 0 to 1. There is a continuum of investors, and the total
population size is N . They have access to a riskless bank account with an interest rate r. There
are two assets, assets 1 and 2, which are traded in two separate markets. The supplies for assets
1 and 2 are X1 and X2, respectively, and X1+X2 < N . The two assets have the same cash ows,
and each unit of the asset pays $1 per unit of time until innity. However, asset 1 is less liquid
than asset 2.
Our formulation of the market for asset 1 follows Garleanu (2009) and Lagos and Rocheteau
(2009). In this market, investors face a potential delay in nding market makers. Once they meet
a market maker, they can execute their trades and take the price P1 as given. The potential delay
is as follows. Let b1 and 
s
1 be the measures of buyers and sellers in the market for asset 1, and
both will be determined endogenously in equilibrium. A buyer meets a market maker at the rate
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s1, where  > 0 is a constant. That is, during [t; t + dt) a buyer meets a market maker with
a probability s1dt. Similarly, a seller meets a market maker who can buy his asset at the rate
b1. Hence, the total number of trades per unit of time is 
s
1
b
1. The search friction reduces
when  increases, and completely disappears when  goes to innity.
This formulation is a slight modication of that in Garleanu (2009) and Lagos and Rocheteau
(2009). Specically, we assume that the arrival rate of the market maker depends on the popu-
lation size of the investors on the other size of the market. For example, for a buyer, the larger
the seller population s1, the quicker the buyer is expected to nd a market maker to sell him the
asset. This captures the notion that an investor faces a shorter delay if there are more investors
trying to be on the other side of the transaction.1
The market for asset 2 is more liquid. To simplify our analysis, we let the search technology
in market 2 go to perfection, i.e., investors in market 2 can trade instantly.2
2.1 Trading needs
Investors have dierent types, and their types may change over time. If an investor's current type
is , he derives a utility 1+ when receiving the $1 coupon from either asset. One interpretation
for a positive  is that some investors, such as insurance companies, have a strong preference for
long-term bonds, as modeled in Vayanos and Vila (2009). Another interpretation is that some
investors can benet from using those assets as collateral and so value them more, as discussed
in Bansal and Coleman (1996) and Gorton (2010). An interpretation of a negative  can be that
the investor suers a liquidity shock and so nds it costly to carry the asset on his balance sheet.
We assume that  can take any value in a closed interval. Without loss of generality, we can
normalize the interval to

0;

.
Each investor's type changes independently with intensity . That is, during [t; t+ dt), with
a probability dt, an investor's type changes and is independently drawn from a random variable,
which has a probability density function f () on the support 0;, with f () < 1 for any
1We also solve our model without this modication. All our main results, except for the welfare implication in
Section 2.8, remain similar.
2We also solved a version of the model in which the search technology in market 2 is imperfect but is better
than the one in market 1. All our results remain similar.
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 2 0;. We use F () to denote the corresponding cumulative distribution function.
The changes in investors' types make them trade the two assets. Following Due, Garleanu,
and Pedersen (2005) and Vayanos and Wang (2007), we assume each investor can hold either 0 or
1 unit of only one of the assets.3 Hence, an investor can buy an asset only when he currently does
not hold either asset, and can sell an asset only if he is currently holding the asset. All investors
are risk-neutral and share the same time discount rate r. An investor's objective function is given
by
sup
1 ;2
Et
Z 1
t
e r( t) ((1 + 2 ) (1 +  )d   P1d1   P2d2 )

;
where 1 and 2 are the investor's holdings in assets 1 and 2 at time  ;  is the investor's type
at time  ; and Pi , for i = 1; 2, is asset i's price at time  and will be determined in equilibrium.
2.2 Demographics
Investors can be classied into three categories: owners of asset 1 (1t = 1 and 2t = 0), owners
of asset 2 (1t = 0 and 2t = 1), and non-owners (i.e., 1t = 2t = 0). This section describes each
category in detail.
A non-owner with a type  has three choices: search to buy asset 1, buy asset 2, or stay
inactive. We conjecture and verify later that a non-owner's optimal choice can be summarized as8<:
stay inactive if  2 [0;0);
search to buy asset 1 if  2 (0;0 );
buy asset 2 if  2 (0 ;]:
(1)
That is, he buys asset 2 if  > 0 , searches to buy asset 1 if  2 (0;0 ), and stays inactive
if  < 0. A non-owner is indierent between staying inactive and searching to buy asset 1 at
0, and is indierent between searching to buy asset 1 and buying asset 2 at 0 . Note that due
to the search friction in market 1, the buyers of asset 1 face a delay in their transactions. In the
meantime, their types may change, and then they will adjust their actions accordingly. In market
2, however, the buyers become owners of asset 2 instantly.
3This deviates from the formulation in Garleanu (2009) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), where the asset
holdings are not restricted. We keep this traditional assumption on asset holdings for tractability. We impose the
same asset holding restriction in both markets to isolate the eects from the search friction in market 1. More
generally, in the case where the search technology in market 2 is imperfect, this formulation isolates the eects from
the dierence in the search frictions across the two markets.
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An owner of asset 1 has two choices: search to sell asset 1 or hold on to it. We conjecture and
later verify that this investor's optimal choice can be summarized as
search to sell his asset if  2 [0;1);
hold on to his asset if  2 (1;]:
(2)
That is, he searches to sell asset 1 if  < 1, holds on to the asset if  > 1, and is indierent
between the two actions if his type is 1. Moreover, investors face a delay in selling their asset 1.
In the meantime, their types may change, and they may need to adjust their actions accordingly.
If an investor succeeds in selling his asset 1, he becomes a non-owner and faces the three choices
described in equation (1).
An owner of asset 2 also has two choices: sell it or hold on to it. We conjecture and later
verify that this investor's optimal choice can be summarized as
sell his asset if  2 [0;2);
hold on to his asset if  2 (2;]:
(3)
That is, he sells asset 2 if  < 2, holds on to the asset if  > 2, and is indierent between the
two actions if his type is 2. Since there is no search friction in market 2, investors can execute
their transactions right away.
Due to the change in  and execution of his trade, an investor's status changes over time.
We now describe the evolution of the population sizes of each category of investors. Since we will
focus on the steady-state equilibrium, we will omit the time subscript for the population size of
each group of investors. For i = 1; 2, we use si to denote the population size of the sellers for
asset i, and use bi to denote the population size of the buyers for asset i. Similarly, we use 
h
i ,
for i = 0; 1; 2; to denote the population sizes of the inactive investors who are non-owners, owners
of asset 1, and owners of asset 2, respectively. Hence, there are seven groups of investors.
Figure 2 illustrates investors' migration across the seven groups. For sellers of asset 1, for
example, the inow to this group during the period [t; t + dt) is h1F (

1)dt, since F (

1) is
the intensity for an inactive asset 1 holder to become a seller (i.e., his type becomes lower than
1). The outow from the group of asset-1 sellers has two components. First, during the period
[t; t + dt), b1
s
1dt investors succeed in selling their asset 1 and become inactive non-owners.
Second, s1 [1  F (1)] dt investors do not want to sell asset 1 any more because their types now
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become higher than 1. In the steady state, the inow equals the outow:
h1F (

1) = 
b
1
s
1 + 
s
1 [1  F (1)] : (4)
Figure 2: This plot illustrates each investor group's size and inows and outows. The black solid
arrows denote the ows induced by trading, and the blue dash arrows denote the ows due to the
changes in investors' types.
Applying the same logic to the buyers of asset 1, inactive owners of asset 1, and inactive
non-owners, we obtain the following:
h0 [F (

0 ) F (0)] + h2 [F (2) F (0)] = b1s1 + b1[F (0) + 1 F (0 )]; (5)
s1 [1  F (1)] + b1s1 = h1F (1); (6)
b1
s
1 + 

b1 + 
h
2

F (0) = 
h
0 [1  F (0)]: (7)
Following Garleanu (2009) and Lagos and Rocheteau (2009), we also assume that the market
makers do not hold inventory and simply serve as match makers. This implies that
b1 = 
s
1: (8)
Market 2 has no search friction, the measures of buyers and sellers are innitesimal,
b2 = 

h0 + 
b
1

[1  F (0 )]dt (9)
s2 = 
h
2F (

2)dt; (10)
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and during each instant [t; t+ dt), the ow of buyers is equal to the ow of sellers
h0 + 
b
1

[1  F (0 )] = h2F (2): (11)
Finally, the investors in all groups add up to the total population:
h1 + 
s
1 + 
b
1 + 
h
2 + 
s
2 + 
b
2 + 
h
0 = N: (12)
2.3 Value functions
For the case 1t = 2t = 0 (i.e., the investor is a non-owner), we use V
b
1 (), V
b
2 (), and V
h
0 () to
denote the investor's expected utility if he chooses to buy asset 2, to search to buy asset 1, and
to stay inactive, respectively. For the case 1t = 1 and 2t = 0 (i.e., the investor is an owner of
asset 1), we use V s1 () and V
h
1 () to denote the investor's expected utility if he searches to sell
asset 1, and to keep asset 1, respectively. For the case 1t = 0 and 2t = 1 (i.e., the investor is an
owner of asset 2), we use V s2 () and V
h
2 () to denote the investor's expected utility if he chooses
to sell asset 2, and to keep asset 2, respectively. In the steady state, these expected utilities are
time-invariant, implying the following:
V b1 () =
s1

V h1 ()  P1

+ E

max

V b1 (
0) ; V b2 (0) ; V h0 (0)
	
s1 + + r
; (13)
V h1 () =
1 ++ E

max

V s1 (
0) ; V h1 (0)
	
+ r
; (14)
V s1 () =
1++ b1max

V h0 () ; V
b
2()
	
+b1P1+E

max

V s1(
0) ; V h1 (0)
	
b1 + + r
; (15)
V b2 () = V
h
2 ()  P2; (16)
V s2 () = max
n
V h0 () ; V
b
1 ()
o
+ P2; (17)
V h2 () =
1 ++ E

max

V s2 (
0) ; V h2 (0)
	
+ r
; (18)
V h0 () =

+ r
E
h
max
n
V b1
 
0

; V b2
 
0

; V h0
 
0
oi
: (19)
2.4 Prices with trading ctions
Once we explicitly account for the trading friction, the notion of the price of an asset is dierent
that in a reduced-form model. For example, an holder of asset 1 can no longer exchange the asset
for P1 instantly. This straight forward but easy-to-overlook feature implies that investors' value
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functions have dierent sensitivities to P1 and P2. From equation (13), we obtain the following
lemma.
Lemma 1 An investor's expected utility is more sensitive to P2 than to P1:
@V b2 ()
@P2
=  1 and
@V b1 ()
@P1
=   s1s1++r .
The intuition is the following. The market for asset 2 is perfectly liquid, i.e., a buyer can pay P2 to
get asset 2 right away. Hence, holding everything else constant, a one-dollar drop in P2 increases
the investor's expected utility by one dollar. In contrast, a one-dollar drop in P1 does not mean
the investor gets a one-dollar benet. This is because the market for asset 1 is illiquid, and the
investor may not be able to benet fully from the price drop. Due to the delay in searching,
the investor can only enjoy the benet in the future. Moreover, the investor may not be able to
benet at all if he cannot meet a seller before his  changes and his demand disappears. As a
result, the investor's expected utility is less sensitive to P1.
This intuition is absent in the money-in-the-utility-function formulation, where the trading
friction is not explicitly modeled and the notion of liquidity is captured by putting the liquid asset
directly into investors' utility function. Hence, the sensitivity of the buyer's expected utility to
price is still one-to-one: a one-dollar drop in price increases the expected utility by one dollar.
The essence is that the notion of market price is dierent in a setup where frictions are modeled
explicitly than in a setup that treats frictions implicitly. In models with explicit trading frictions,
the market price is not the price at which investors can transact at immediately.
2.5 Equilibrium
Denition 1 A steady-state equilibrium consists of asset prices P1 and P2, the cuto points
(0;0 ;1;2), such that
1) the sizes of each group (h1 ; 
s
1; 
b
1; 
h
2 ; 
s
2; 
b
2; 
h
0) remain constants over time, i.e., satisfy
(4){(12);
2) the choices implied by (1){(3) and (13){(19) are optimal for all investors;
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3) both markets clear:
X1 = 
h
1 + 
s
1: (20)
X2 = 
h
2 : (21)
Proposition 1 The steady-state equilibrium for the above economy is the following. The cuto
points are given by
0 = 

1 = 
;
2 = 

0 = 
;
where
 = F 1

1  X1 +X2
N

; (22)
 = F 1

1  X2
N  X1

: (23)
The population sizes for each group are given by
s1 = 
b
1 = 1; (24)
h1 = X1   1; (25)
h0 = N  X2  X1   1; (26)
h2 = X2; (27)
b2 = X2

1  X2
N  X1

dt (28)
s2 = X2

1  X2
N  X1

dt; (29)
where
1 
s 
2
2
+
X1


1  X1 +X2
N

  
2
: (30)
The asset prices are given by
P1 =
1 +
r
+

r
R 
 [1  F ()] d
1 + + r
  
r
R 
0 F () d
1 + + r
; (31)
P2 =
1 +
r
  1
1 + + r
  
r
: (32)
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This proposition shows that, the four cuto points collapse into two:  and . A non-owner
with a type  is indierent from buying asset 1 and not buying any asset. A holder of asset 1
with a type  is indierent between holding the asset and selling it. Similarly, a non-owner with
a type  is indierent from buying asset 1 and buying asset 2; a holder of asset 2 with a type
 is indierent between holding the asset and selling it.
Equations (24){(29) characterize the population size of each group. In particular, equation
(24) shows that the buyers and sellers for asset 1 have the same population size. Moreover, since
there is no delay in trading asset 2, at each point in time, the groups of investors who need to
buy or sell asset 2 (i.e., b2 and 
s
2) are innitesimal, as shown in equations (28) and (29). Hence,
virtually all the supply of asset 2 is held by inactive holders, as shown in equation (27).
Equation (31) shows that asset 1's price has three components. The rst term, 1+

r , is the
marginal investor's present value of the cash ow and convenience yield  from the asset. The
second term reects the liquidity eect from the buyers, whose types range from  to . Eager
to get the asset, they are willing to pay a higher price. On the other hand, the trading friction
makes sellers, whose types range from 0 to , willing to sell at a low price. This eect is captured
by the third term. When the search friction disappears, i.e.,  goes to innity, the last two terms
converge to 0 and P1 converges to
1+
r .
The price of asset 2 is in equation (32). The rst term, 1+

r , is the marginal investor's
present value of the cash ow and convenience yield  from the asset. The second term reects
the discount due to the investors' outside option of buying asset 1. Asset 1 is cheaper, but one
has to face a delay in the transaction. The higher the search friction, the less valuable the outside
option of buying asset 1 is. When the search friction goes to innity (i.e.,  goes to 0), the outside
option value goes to 0 and the second term becomes 0. On the other hand, when the search
friction disappears, i.e.,  goes to innity, P2 converges to
1+
r . That is, when the search friction
disappears, the two assets become the same and have the same price.
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Proposition 2 The eect of the search friction on asset prices is as follows:
@P1
@
< 0 if    >
Z 
0
F () d;
@P1
@
> 0 if    <
Z 
0
F () d;
@P2
@
< 0:
When the search technology in market 1 improves, its eect on P1 depends on the tradeo between
the eect on buyers and the eect on sellers, which are captured by the second and third terms
in equation (31). Note that the condition    > R 0 F () d is equivalent to the second
term being larger than the third term, that is, the eect on buyers dominates. In this case, due
to the search friction, buyers push up P1. Hence, when the search technology improves, this eect
weakens and P1 decreases. Similarly, in the other case, 
   < R 0 F () d, the eect on
sellers dominates and P1 increases when the search techonology improves.
Finally, when the search technology improves, it increases asset 2 buyers' outside option value,
since they can more easily obtain asset 1. This reduces the comparative advantage of asset 2 and
so reduces P2.
2.6 The liquidity premium
Since assets 1 and 2 have identical cash ows, the price dierence, P2   P1, reects the liquidity
premium. From (31) and (32), the liquidity premium is given by
LP =
   + r
R 
0 F () d
1 + + r
: (33)
The above expression immediately shows that the liquidity premium is always positive and de-
creases when the search friction decreases (i.e., when  increases). As  goes to innity, the
friction in market 1 disappears, and the liquidity premium converges to 0.
Another observation from (33) is that the liquidity premium depends on not only the marginal
investor's liquidity preference , but also the distribution of all investors' preferences F (). In
particular, the liquidity premium is increasing in  but decreasing in . Intuitively, investor
 is the marginal investor who is indierent between buying assets 1 and 2. He can pay P2
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to obtain asset 2 right away. Asset 1 is cheaper, but he has to face a delay in the transaction.
In the meantime, he is giving up his convenience . The investor is indierent about the two
assets if the price dierence (i.e., the liquidity premium) is the same as the present value of the
convenience that the marginal investor expects to lose during his search. Hence, the liquidity
premium increases in .
It is less obvious that the liquidity premium also depends on . The intuition is the following.
Suppose  decreases. This reduces P1 since the type- investor is the marginal investor between
buying asset 1 and not buying any asset. How does P2 respond to the drop in P1? For investor-
 to be indierent between assets 1 and 2, P2 has to decrease. If P1 drops by one dollar, how
much should P2 decrease to keep investor-
 indierent? The answer is less than one dollar.
The reason is that, as noted in Lemma 1, an investor's expected utility is more sensitive to P2
than to P1. That is, after a one-dollar drop in P1, it takes a smaller drop in P2 to keep the investor
indierent between the two assets. Therefore, a decrease in  increases the liquidity premium.
The above result naturally leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 3 The liquidity premium decreases in X2 (i.e.,
@LP
@X2
< 0) if
1
f ()
+
X1
h
   + r
R 
0 F () d
i
(21 + ) (1 + + r)
<
N
 
1 + rF (
)

N  X1
1
f ()
; (34)
but increases in X2 (i.e.,
@LP
@X2
> 0) if
1
f ()
+
X1
h
   + r
R 
0 F () d
i
(21 + ) (1 + + r)
>
N
 
1 + rF (
)

N  X1
1
f ()
: (35)
This proposition shows that the supply of asset 2 may increase or decrease the liquidity
premium, depending on the distribution of the investors' liquidity preferences. Intuitively, since
an increase in X2 attracts more investors with high , it pushes down both 
 and . That is,
the increase in X2 has two eects. First, it decreases 
 and so decreases the premium. Second,
it decreases  and so increases the liquidity premium. The strength of the two eects depends
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on the sensitivity of  and  to X2. From (22) and (23), we have
@
@X2
=   1
Nf()
;
@
@X2
=   1
(N  X1) f() :
So, the strength of the two eects is decreasing in f() and f(), respectively.
Intuitively, a higher f() means that there are more investors whose types are around .
Hence, an increase in X2 pushes down 
 less, and so the rst eect (i.e., the eect through
) is weaker. Similarly, the strength of the second eect is weaker if f() is larger. This is
illustrated in Figure 1. Panel A reects condition (34): f() is high relative to f(). Hence,
the rst eect (i.e., the eect through ) dominates and the supply of asset 2 decreases the
liquidity premium. Similarly, under condition (35), as illustrated in Panel B, f() is high
relative to f(). The second eect (i.e., the eect through ) dominates and an increase in X2
increases the liquidity premium.
To better illustrate the result in Proposition 3, and also demonstrate that conditions (34) and
(35) are both attainable, we parameterize the density function f() as
f () = aa 1; (36)
for  2 (0; 1), where a is a constant and a > 0. The case a = 1 corresponds the uniform
distribution. When a increases, the slope of f() increases. So, a small a corresponds to the case
in Panel A of Figure 1, and a large a represents the case in Panel B.
Corollary 1 For the distribution in (36), @LP@X2 < 0 if a < ba, and @LP@X2 > 0 if a > ba, where ba is a
constant and given by equation (76) in the Appendix.
In the uniform distribution case, i.e., a = 1, the liquidity premium is decreasing in X2, since
we can see from the Appendix that the constant ba is larger than 2. The corollary shows that the
liquidity premium becomes increasing in X2 only when the slope of f() is suciently large, i.e.,
a > ba, as illustrated in Panel B of Figure 1.
The empirical evidence in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012) suggests that the
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supply of Treasury securities decreases their premium. This is consistent with the implication
from the case a < ba or Panel A in Figure 1. That is, the liquidity preference among investors is
such that many investors have a modest convenience (i.e., ), while some other investors have
large . One can think of these investors with large  as banks, which can use Treasury securities
as collateral to issue checking accounts, or hedge funds that use Treasury securities as collateral
for their derivative positions. Normal investors, however, do not benet as much from the liquidity
and safety in Treasury securities.
The case where a > ba (i.e., Panel B in Figure 1) may be relevant for some other occasions.
For example, if one interprets asset 1 as junk bonds and asset 2 as bonds with investment grade
and above, such as investment-grade corporate bonds, agency bonds and Treasury securities etc.
Hence, most investors hold asset 2 for its liquidity and safety, and only a small of investors
with expertise (e.g., hedge funds) are marginal investors for junk bonds. That is, f() is small
relative to f(), as in Panel B. In this case, the novel prediction from our model is that when
the supply of Treasury or investment-grade bonds increases, the spread between junk bonds and
investment-grade bonds should go up.4
2.7 Trading needs and asset prices
How do investors' trading needs aect the asset prices and liquidity premium? In the model,
investors' trading needs are summarized by . The higher  is, the more frequently each investor's
type changes, and hence the stronger the trading need. From Proposition 1, we obtain the
following.
Proposition 4
@P1
@
(
> 0 if    < R 0 F () d
< 0 if    > R 0 F () d
@P2
@

< 0 if  < ;
> 0 if  > ;
4We run regressions similar to those in Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen (2012). However, the high yield
index is available only after 1997. Perhaps due to the short sample period, we do not nd a signicant relation
between the Treasury supply and the spread between junk bonds and investment-grade bonds.
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where
  r
1 +
q
rN
X1(N X1 X2)
:
This proposition shows that the impact of trading need on P1 depends on the impacts of the
buyers and sellers in market 1. As noted in Proposition 2,     < R 0 F () d implies
that the buyers' impact dominates. In this case, more trading need increases P1. Similarly, if the
sellers' impact dominates, i.e.,    > R 0 F () d, more trading need decreases P1.
The eect of  on P2 is more subtle. When  increases, it has two eects. First, it means
more investors search in market 1, making it more liquid. This reduces asset 2's advantage and
decreases P2. Second, a higher  also means that investors expect a shorter holding period. This
makes the delay in trading asset 1 even less appealing, and hence increases P2. When  is smaller
than , the rst eect dominates and @P2@ < 0. In fact, when  goes to 0, both 
s
1 and 
b
1 go to
0, that is, market 1 becomes completely illiquid and @P2@ converges to  1. On the other hand,
when  > , investors expect to hold an asset only for a short period of time. This makes the
delay in market 1 less tolerable. Hence, the second eect dominates and @P2@ > 0. Taken together,
it is easy to see that the eect of  on the liquidity premium is mixed and depends on the relative
strength of the four eects discussed above.
2.8 Welfare
This section endogenizes the investment in the search technology, and analyzes the welfare im-
plications. In particular, we specify the cost of investing in the search technology and the cor-
responding matching function as the following. Investor i has to pay  (i) to obtain a search
technology i, where  () is continuous, dierentiable, increasing, and convex, with  (0) = 0,
 0(1) = 1. For simplicity, the cost  (i) is paid at t = 0 before the investor knows his type,
and there is no further cost to maintain the technology and investors cannot make adjustments
to their technology after t = 0. Suppose investor i is a buyer in market 1. Let  denote the
average technology chosen by sellers. Then, during [t; t + dt) this buyer meets a seller with a
probability

i + (1  )

s1dt. That is, the matching intensity is a linear combination of the
buyer's technology i and the average technology of all sellers . Similarly, suppose that investor
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i is a seller in market 1 and that  is buyers' average technology. Then, during [t; t + dt) this
seller meets a buyer with a probability

i + (1  )

b1dt.
An investor's objective function is
max
i
E[V ()]   (i) (37)
where E[V ()] is an investor's expected value function across states in the steady states. We
consider a symmetric equilibrium, in which all investors choose the same level of technology. One
degenerate equilibrium is that all investors choose not to invest in their search technology at
all and the market for asset 1 is shut down. In the following, we focus on the more interesting
equilibrium where investors choose to invest, and denote this decentralized choice as d.
As a comparison, we also analyze the choice of a central planner, who chooses the technology
investment for all investors to maximize
max

E[V ()]   (): (38)
We denote this centralized choice as c. The dierence between (37) and (38) is that when
an investor makes a decentralized decision in (37), he takes other investors' choice  and the
population distribution (e.g., b1 and 
s
1) as given. In (38), however, the central planner internalizes
the consequences of investors' decisions. The following proposition compares the investment
choices across the two cases.
Proposition 5 There are unique solutions d and c to (37) and (38), respectively. If   12 ,
decentralized decisions lead to underinvest, i.e., d < c. If  > 12 , decentralized decisions may
lead to over- or underinvestment.
There are two externalities in this economy. First, an investor's investment in his technology
also benets his potential future trading partners. This positive externality leads to a free-riding
problem, and hence underinvestment relative to the rst best. Second, as the search technology
improves, more investors' trading needs get matched, and hence fewer investors are left searching in
the market, reducing the marginal benet of searching for all investors. This negative externality
leads to overinvestment.
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The strength of the rst externality is determined by . The smaller the , the stronger the
free riding problem. The proposition shows that in the case of   12 , the free-riding problem
always dominates and leads to underinvestment relative to the central planning case. In the case
of  > 12 , however, the second externality may dominate. In particular, Panel A of Figure 3 plots
the sensitivity of the population size to the search technology,  @b1=@, against . It shows
that this sensitivity is the strongest when  is in the intermediate region. This is the region
where the second externality is the strongest. Hence, as shown in Panel B, in the intermediate
region for , we have d > c, i.e., investors overinvest relative to a central planner in this region.
That is, decentralized decisions lead to underinvestment in the matching technology in markets
where investors expect to trade very infrequently or very frequently, but lead to overinvestment
in markets where the trading frequency is intermediate.
Panel A Panel B
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Figure 3: Panel A plots  @b1=@, against . Panel B plots d   c, against . Parameters for
both panels: X1 = 10, X2 = 10, N = 22. Other parameters for Panel B:  = 0:7, r = 0:02,  = 1,
 () = 0:14.
3 The safety premium
The analysis so far has focused on the liquidity premium. We now move on to analyze the safety
premium. In particular, we modify the model by introducing a default risk to asset 1. Specically,
asset 1 pays a constant cash ow of $1 per unit of time, until default, which has an intensity of
. That is, during [t; t+ dt), a fraction dt of asset-1 holders lose their holdings in asset 1, while
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the remaining asset-1 holders are intact. If default happens to an investor who is trying to sell
his asset 1, he becomes an inactive non-owner. Alternatively, if an investor is an inactive holder
of asset 1 when default happens to his holding, he then chooses his optimal strategy (buy asset
1, buy asset 2, or stay inactive) according to his current type .
To keep the steady state stable, we assume that X1dt units of asset 1 are issued to market
1 during [t; t+ dt), so that the total amount of asset 1 outstanding remains a constant over time.
We can think of the sellers of the newly issued asset 1 as investment bankers. They are treated
the same as other sellers in market 1. The only dierence is that the investment bankers leave the
market after they sell their assets. Hence, at each point in time, some investment bankers leave
and market and other investment bankers enter the market with newly issued asset 1. In the
steady state, the population size of investment bankers in the market remain constant over time.
The steady-state equilibrium is dened analogously to that in Denition 1, and is characterized
in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 The steady-state equilibrium is given by
P1 =
1 +y
 + r
+

 + r
yy  y   R y0 F () d
b1 + +  + r
; (39)
P2 =
1 +yy
r
  
b
1
b1 + +  + r
yy  y
r
; (40)
where b1 is the solution to
1


b1 +
+ 


b1 + 
X1
  
b1

= 1 
1
+
 
b1
2
+ b1 +X2
N   +
b1
b1+
X1
; (41)
and
F

yy

= 1  X2
N   +
b1
b1+
X1
;
F (y) =
1


b1 +
+ 


b1 + 
X1
  
b1

;
s1 = 
b
1  
X1
b1 + 
;
h1 = X1   b1;
h0 = N  X2  
b1
b1 + 
X1   b1:
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The equilibrium shares many similar properties to those in Proposition 1. For example,
similar to the two cuto points in the baseline model, we now have two cuto points y and yy.
Investor-y is indierent between searching to buy asset 1 and staying inactive, and investor-yy
is indierent between searching to buy asset 1 and buying asset 2.
The price of asset 1 is determined by the valuation of the marginal investor y (i.e., 1+
y
+r )
and the illiquidity eect from the buyers and sellers (i.e., the last term in equation (39)). The
price of asset 2 is determined by its marginal investor's valuation 1+
yy
r , and the discount due to
the investor's outside option of buying asset 1 (i.e., the last term in equation (40)). When the
search friction disappears, i.e.,  goes to innity, asset 1 becomes perfectly liquid and its price P1
converges to 1+

+r , and P2 converges to
1+
r .
The price dierence, P2   P1, is due to the better liquidity and safety of asset 2. To isolate
the impact from safety, we dene the safety premium as
SP  lim
!0
P1   P1;
where lim!0 P1 is the limit of the price of asset 1 when the default intensity converges to 0. One
can think of lim!0 P1 as the price of an asset that is as liquid as asset 1, but as safe as asset
2. Hence, SP reects the safety premium that asset 2 commands. The following proposition
characterizes the properties of the safety premium.
Proposition 7 If  is suciently large, the safety premium decreases with the supply of asset 2,
@SP
@X2
< 0, and this impact is stronger when the default intensity is higher, @
2SP
@X2@
< 0.
Due to the default risk, the expected cash ow from asset 1 is lower. So, it is not surprising
that there is a safety premium. However, the above proposition shows that the safety premium
is related to the supply of asset 2. Intuitively, in the absence of default, the marginal investor of
asset 1 enjoys a convenience yield of y. The default risk, however, means that he can get only
a fraction of it in expectation. That is, the safety premium reects a fraction of the convenience
yield y that is expected to be wiped out by default. Hence, the safety premium increases in
y. When the supply of asset 2 increaes, it attracts more investors with high types, and so
reduces y and the safety premium. Moreover, when the default intensity  is higher, the safety
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premium reects a larger fraction of the convenience yields y, and hence is more sensitive to y.
Therefore, the eect of supply of asset 2 on the safety premium is stronger.
4 Conclusion
We have analyzed a micro-founded model of the safety and liquidity premium. Relative to the
reduced-form money-in-the-utility-function approach, our model explicitly examines investors'
trading needs and trading frictions. One new insight from our approach is that the marginal
investor's preference for safety and liquidity is no longer enough in determining the premium.
Instead, the distribution of all investors' preferences plays a direct role. The model implies that
an increase in the supply of Treasury securities decreases the credit spread of investment-grade
bonds, but may increase the spread between junk bonds and investment-grade bonds. Our analysis
highlights the importance of explicitly modeling trading frictions. This is parallel to the point
stressed in the classical search-theoretical model of Kiyotaki and Wright (1989), which emphasizes
the importance of explicitly modeling the frictions that render money essential.
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Appendix
In the following, we sketch the proofs of our main results and leave the details of some derivations
to our online appendix at http://faculty.som.yale.edu/hongjunyan/.
Proof of Propositions 1{4
Step I. Non-owner's optimal strategy. Equation (19) implies that V h0 () is a constant for all .
We denote it by U  V h0 (). Dierentiating (16) and (13), we obtain
dV b2 ()
d
=
dV h2 ()
d
=
1
+ r
; (42)
dV b1 ()
d
=
s1
s1 + + r
dV h1 ()
d
=
s1
s1 + + r
1
+ r
: (43)
Hence, V b2 () and V
b
1 () are linear in  and
dV b2 ()
d >
dV b1 ()
d > 0 =
dV h0 ()
d , for any . We thus
conjecture that there exist two cuto points, 0 and 0 , such that
maxfV h0 () ; V b1 () ; V b2 ()g =
8<:
U , if  2 [0;0) ;
V b1 () , if  2 (0;0 ) ;
V b2 () , if  2
 
0 ;

;
(44)
V b1 (

0) = V
h
0 (

0) = U; (45)
V b1 (

0 ) = V
b
2 (

0 ) : (46)
From (45) and (46), we can write V b1 () and V
b
2 () as
V b1 () = V
b
1 (

0) +
s1
s1 + + r
 0
+ r
= U +
s1
s1 + + r
 0
+ r
; (47)
V b2 () = V
b
2 (

0 ) +
 0
+ r
= U +
s1
s1 + + r
0  0
+ r
+
 0
+ r
; (48)
where have used V b1 (

0) = U in (47) and V
b
2 (

0 ) = U +
s1
s1++r
0  0
+r in (48).
From (19) and the optimal strategy specied in (44), we have
U =

+ r
"Z 0
0
UdF () +
Z 0
0
V b1 () dF () +
Z 
0
V b2 () dF ()
#
:
Substituting (47) and (48) into the above equation and rearranging, we obtain
U =

r
24 s1
s1 + + r
R 0
0
[1  F ()] d
+ r
+
R 
0
[1  F ()] d
+ r
35 : (49)
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Step II. Asset 2 owner's optimal strategy. Dierentiating (18), we obtain
dV h2 ()
d
=
1
+ r
: (50)
Equations (17) and (44) imply that
V s2 () =
(
U + P2, if  < 

0;
U + P2 +
s1
s1++r
 0
+r , if   0:
(51)
Since the slope of V h2 () is larger than that of V
s
2 () for all , we conjecture that there
exists a cuto point 2 such that
maxfV s2 () ; V h2 ()g =

V s2 () , if  < 

2;
V h2 () , if   2;
(52)
V s2 (

2) = V
h
2 (

2) : (53)
We have the following chain of equalities:
U +
s1
s1 + + r
0  0
+ r
(a)
= V b1 (

0 )
(b)
= V b2 (

0 )
(c)
= V h2 (

0 )  P2
(d)
=
1 +0 + E

max

V s2 (
0) ; V h2 (0)
	
+ r
  P2;
where (a) is due to (47), (b) is due to (46), (c) is due to (16), and (d) is due to (18). Rearranging,
we have
U + P2 =
1 +0 + E

max

V s2 (
0) ; V h2 (0)
	
+ r
  
s
1
s1 + + r
0  0
+ r
: (54)
It is easy to verify that 2 > 0. Hence, equation (51) implies
V s2 (

2) = U + P2 +
s1
s1 + + r
2  0
+ r
:
The above equation, (18), and (53) imply
U + P2 =
1 +2 + E

max

V s2 (
0) ; V h2 (0)
	
+ r
  
s
1
s1 + + r
2  0
+ r
: (55)
From equations (54) and (55) we have 2 = 0  :
Step III. Asset 1 owner's optimal strategy. Dierentiating (14) and (15), we obtain
dV h1 ()
d
=
1
+ r
; (56)
26
dV s1 ()
d
=
(
1
b1++r
, if  < b0;
1
+r , if  >
b0; (57)
where b0 = s10+(+r)0s1++r 2 (0;0 ).
The slope of V s1 () and V
h
1 () are the same for the region  >
b0. We must have V s1 (b0) 
V h1 (
b0), because otherwise it implies V s1 () > V h1 () for all , i.e., no investors want to hold
asset 1. Hence, there should be a cuto point 1, such that 1  b0 and
maxfV s1 () ; V h1 ()g =

V s1 () , if  < 

1;
V h1 () , if   1;
(58)
V s1 (

1) = V
h
1 (

1) : (59)
From (57), we obtain
V s1 () =
8<: V
s
1 (

1) +
 1
b1++r
, if   b0;
V s1 (

1) +
b0 1
b1++r
+  b0+r , if  > b0: (60)
Since 1  b0, we have the following chain of equalities:
V s1 (

1)
(a)
=
(b)
=(+r)V h1 (1)
(c)
=(+r)V s1 (1)z }| {
1 + 1 + E
h
max
n
V s1
 
0

; V h1
 
0
oi
+ b1 (U + P1)
b1 + + r
=
(+ r)V s1 (

1) + 
b
1 (U + P1)
b1 + + r
(d)
= U + P1; (61)
where (a) is due to (15), (b) is due to (14), (c) is due to (59), and (d) is the result after some
algebra. Therefore, (61) and (59) lead to
V h1 (

1) = U + P1: (62)
Because V h1 () is linear in  as shown in (56), we have
V h1 (

0) = V
h
1 (

1) +
0  1
+ r
= U + P1 +
0  1
+ r
: (63)
On the other hand,
U
(a)
= V b1 (

0)
(b)
=
s1

V h1 (

0)  P1

+
(c)
=(+r)Uz }| {
E
h
max
n
V b1
 
0

; V b2
 
0

; V h0
 
0
oi
s1 + + r
=
s1

V h1 (

0)  P1

+ (+ r)U
s1 + + r
(d)
= V h1 (

0)  P1; (64)
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where (a) is due to (45), (b) is due to (13), (c) is due to (15), and (d) can be obtained after some
algebra. Substituting (63) into the above equation and rearranging, we nd
0 = 

1  : (65)
Step IV. From (58), we have
E
h
max
n
V s1 () ; V
h
1 ()
oi
=
Z 
0
V s1 () dF () +
Z 

V h1 () dF () : (66)
Here, V h1 () can be expressed as
V h1 () = V
h
1 (
) +
 
+ r
:
Substituting the above expression and (60) into (66), after some algebra, we have
E
h
max
n
V s1 () ; V
h
1 ()
oi
= V h1 (
) 
R 
0 F () d
b1 + + r
+
R 
 [1  F ()] d
+ r
: (67)
From (14), we have
V h1 (
) =
1 + + E

max

V s1 (
0) ; V h1 (0)
	
+ r
; (68)
Substituting this into (67) and rearranging, we have
E
h
max
n
V s1 () ; V
h
1 ()
oi
=
+ r
r
241 + 
+ r
 
R 
0 F () d
b1 + + r
+
R 
 [1  F ()] d
+ r
35 :
The above equation, (49), (62) ; and (68) imply
P1 =
1 +
r
+

r
"R 
 [1  F ()] d
1 + + r
 
R 
0 F () d
1 + + r
#
:
Step V. From (52), we have
E
h
max
n
V s2 () ; V
h
2 ()
oi
=
Z 
0
V s2 () dF () +
Z 

V h2 () dF () :
From (53) and (51), we obtain
V h2 () = U + P2 +
s1
s1 + + r
  
+ r
+
 
+ r
:
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Substituting the above equation and V s2 () in (51), we obtain
E
h
max
n
V s2 () ;V
h
2 ()
oi
= U + P2 +
s1
s1 + + r
R 
 [1  F ()] d
+ r
+
R 
 [1  F ()] d
+ r
:
The above equation, (54), and (49) imply
P2 =
1 +
r
  1
1 + + r
  
r
: (69)
Step VI. Substituting (21) into (5) and (7), we have


h0 +X2 + 
b
1

F ()  b1 = b1s1 + 

h0 + 
b
1 +X2

F () ;
h0 = 
b
1
s
1 + 

h0 + 
b
1 +X2

F () : (70)
The above two equations imply
F () = 1  X2
h0 +X2 + 
b
1
:
Substituting (12) and (20) into the above equation, we have (23). Substituting (12) and (20) in
(70), we obtain
 (N  X1  X2)  1 =  (1)2 +  (N  X1)F () : (71)
From (20) and (6), we have
1 +  (1)
2 = X1F (
) : (72)
From (71) and (72), we obtain a quadratic equation of 1:
(1)
2 +


1  
X1


1  X1 +X2
N

= 0: (73)
The positive root is (30). Substituting it into (71), we have (22). It is straightforward to obtain
the comparative statics in Propositions 2{4.
Proof of Corollary 1
With f() in (36), Proposition 3 implies that LP is increasing in X2 if and only if
1
a  B
N
1
a
>
1
a  B + (1 B)a+1a(a+1) rF ()
(N  X1)
1
a
; (74)
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where B 2  0; 12 is given by
B =
X1
2 F (
) 

2
2
+ X1F () +
 

2 + r
q 

2
2
+ X1F ()
:
There are 3 cases. Case 1: If a < 1B , (74) can be rewritten as
1
a  B
1
a  B + (1 B)a+1a(a+1) rF ()
>
N
1
a
(N  X1)
1
a
:
The left hand side (LHS) of the above inequality is smaller than 1, while the right hand side
(RHS) is larger than 1. So, the inequality never holds and LP is decreasing in X2.
Case 2: If 1B  a < a1, where a1 is given by
a1 =
1 B
2B

1 +

r
F ()

+
s
1 B
2B
2 
1 +

r
F ()
2
+
1
B

1 +

r
F ()

;
the LHS of (74) is negative while the RHS of (74) is positive, so the inequality never holds.
Therefore, LP is decreasing in X2.
Case 3: If a  a1, (74) holds if and only if
N  X1
N
<

1  (1 B) a+ 1
(a+ 1) (aB   1)

r
F ()
a
; (75)
Note that the LHS of (75) is between 0 and 1. The RHS of (75) is increasing in a. Moreover,
RHS = 0 if a = a1 and RHS>1 if a is suciently large. Hence, there exists a unique ba > a1 such
that
N  X1
N
=

1  (1 B)ba+ 1
(ba+ 1) (baB   1) r F ()
ba
(76)
and inequality (75) holds if and only if a > ba.
Therefore, combining all three cases, we obtain that the liquidity premium is decreasing in X2
for a < ba and increasing in X2 for a > ba.
Proof of Proposition 5
We rst compute an investor's average value function across  in the steady state. For this,
we use gxi (), where x = b; s; h and i = 0; 1; 2, to denote the density of investors with value
function V xi (). Since one can sell or buy asset 2 immediately, we have g
b
2 () = o (1) and
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gs2 () = o (1) for all . In the steady state, the density and value function for other types of
investors are the following: i) inactive non-owners: V h0 () = U is given by (49) and g
h
0 () =
(N  X1  X2   1) f()F () for  2 [0;]; ii) buyers of asset 1: V b1 () is given by (47) and
gb1 () = 1
f()
F () F () for  2 [;]; iii) inactive owners of asset 1: V h1 () = U+P1+ 

+r
for  2 [;], and
gh1 () =
( h
N   1F () F ()
i
f () , for  2 [;] ;
X1f () , for  2

;

;
iv) sellers of asset 1: V s1 () = U + P1 +
 
1++r
for  2 [;] and gs1 () = 1 f()F () for
 2 [;]; v) owners of asset 2: V h2 () = U+P2+ 

+r   
 
1++r
and gh2 () = (N  X1) f ()
for  2 ;. The expected welfare is given by
E [V ()] =
1
N
"Z 
0
V h0 () g
h
0 () d+
Z 

V b1 () g
b
1 () d
+
Z 

V s1 () g
s
1 () d+
Z 

V h1 () g
h
1 () d+
Z 

V h2 () g
h
2 () d
#
=
1
r
"
X1 +X2
N
+
Z 

dF ()
#
 

r I1 + 1I2
1 + + r
; (77)
where
I1 =

1  X1
N
Z 

[F ()  F ()] d+ X1
N
Z 
0
F () d;
I2 =
1
N
"Z 

F ()  F ()
F ()  F ()d+
Z 

F ()
F ()
d
#
:
Note that the rst term in (77) is the expected utility with no friction, and the second term is the
welfare loss due to search friction. Since 1 itself is also a function of , we will use the notation
1 () to make it explicit. We dene the following function
G (x; y)   

r I1 + I2y
x+ + r
, for x > 0; y > 0,
and so the welfare loss is  G (1 () ; 1 ()). It is easy to see that G (1 () ; 1 ()) is strictly
increasing in  and strictly concave in  and converges to zero when !1.
The optimization problem (37) is equivalent to
max
i
G
 
i + (1  )

1
 


; 1
 

    (i) :
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The decentralized choice d is characterized by the following rst order condition:
1

d
 @G
@x

d1

d

; 1

d

=  0

d

: (78)
The optimization problem (38) is equivalent to
max
i
G (1 () ; 1 ())    () :
The centralized choice c is characterized by the following rst order condition:
@G (1 () ; 1 ())
@x
d [1 ()]
d
+
@G (1 () ; 1 ())
@y
d1 ()
d

=c
=  0 (c) : (79)
Dene
H ()  1 ()
@G
@x
(1 () ; 1 ()) = 1 ()
 G (1 () ; 1 ())
1 () + + r
;
K ()  1 ()
2
1 () + 
1 () +

2
 G (1 () ; 1 ())
1 () + + r
+
(1 ())
2
21 () + 
I2;
then (79) and (78) can be rewritten as
H

d

=  0

d

;
K (c) =  0 (c) ;
and
K () H () = 1 ()
[1 () + + r]
2J () ;
where
J () 

1
2
  +

2
21 () + 


r
I1 +

1  + + r
21 () + 

1 () I2:
It can be shown that J () is decreasing in , and
J ()j=0 = (1  )

r
I1 +

2  + r


I2X1F (
) > 0;
J ()j=1 =

1
2
  


r
I1:
If   12 , then J ()j=1 > 0 and J () > J ()j=1 > 0 for any nite  because J () is
decreasing in . That is, K () > H () for any nite . In this case, we have c > d. To see
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this, we suppose c < d. We then have
 0

d

= H

d

< H (c) < K (c) =  0 (c) :
However,  00 () > 0 implies that  0 (c) <  0  d. This results in a contradiction.
For the case of  > 12 , Figure 3 is sucient to show that both over- and underinvestment are
possible. In the online appendix, we characterize the necessary and sucient condition for over-
and underinvestment.
Proof of Proposition 6
The proof of this proposition is parallel to that of Proposition 1. The extra feature is that during
each instant, a fraction X1dt of asset 1 is wiped out, and the same amount of asset 1 is issued into
the economy. Instead of the quadratic equation (73) in the baseline model, we now have a more
general equation (41) to determine b1. Details for the calculations are in the online appendix.
Proof of Proposition 7
From (41), we expand b1 as
b1 = m
b
1=
p
+ o

1=
p


; (80)
where
mb1 =
s
X1

 + 

1  X1 +X2
N

:
From (80), we can obtain
y =  + o

1=
p


;
yy = F 1
 
1  X2
N   +X1
!
+ o (1) ;
where  is given by (22). We can thus expand P1 and the safety premium as
P1 =
1 +y
 + r
+ o (1) ;
SP =

 
1 + y

r ( + r)
+ o (1) :
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Therefore, when  is suciently large, we have
@SP
@X2
=   
r ( + r)Nf (y)
< 0;
@2SP
@X2@
=   1
( + r)2Nf (y)
< 0:
34
References
Afonso, Gara and Ricardo Lagos, 2015, Trade Dynamics in the Market for Federal Funds, Econo-
metrica, forthcoming.
Bansal, Ravi, and John Coleman, 1996, A Monetary Explanation of the Equity Premium, Term
Premium, and Risk-Free Rate Puzzles, Journal of Political Economy, 104, 1135{1171.
Due, Darrell, Nicolae Garleanu, and Lasse Pedersen, 2002, Securities Lending, Shorting and
Pricing, Journal of Financial Economics, 66, 307{339.
Due, Darrell, Nicolae Garleanu, and Lasse Pedersen, 2005, Over-the-Counter Markets, Econo-
metrica, 73, 1815{1847.
Due, Darrell, Nicolae Garleanu, and Lasse Pedersen, 2007, Valuation in Over-the-Counter
Markets, Review of Financial Studies, 66, 307{339.
Due, Darrell, Piotr Dworczak, and Haoxiang Zhu, 2014, Benchmarks in Search Markets, work-
ing paper.
Feldhutter, Peter, 2012, The same bond at dierent prices: Identifying search frictions and selling
pressures, Review of Financial Studies 25, 1155{1206.
Garleanu, Nicolae, 2009, Portfolio choice and pricing in illiquid markets, Journal of Economic
Theory, 144, 532{564.
Gavazza, Alessandro, 2011, Leasing and secondary markets: Theory and evidence from commer-
cial aircraft, Journal of Political Economy, 119, 325{377.
Gorton, Gary, 2010, Slapped by the Invisible Hand: The Panic of 2007.
He, Zhiguo, and Konstantin Milbradt, 2013, Endogenous Liquidity and Defaultable Debt, Econo-
metrica, forthcoming.
Hugonnier, Julien, Benjamin Lester, and Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2014, Heterogeneity in Decentral-
ized Asset Markets, working paper.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro, and Randall Wright, 1989, On Money as a Medium of Exchange, Journal
of Political Economy, 97, 927{954.
Kiyotaki, Nobuhiro and Randall Wright, 1993, A search-theoretic approach to monetary eco-
nomics, American Economic Review, 83, 63{77.
Krishnamurthy, Arvind, and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, 2012, The Aggregate Demand for Trea-
sury Debt, Journal of Political Economy, 120, 233{267.
Lagos, Ricardo, 2010, Asset Prices and Liquidity in an Exchange Economy, Journal of Monetary
Economy, 57, 913{930.
Lagos Ricardo, and Guillaume Rocheteau, 2009, Liquidity in Asset Markets with Search Fric-
tions, Econometrica, 77, 403{426.
Lagos, Ricardo, Guillaume Rocheteau, and Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2011, Crises and Liquidity in
OTC markets, Journal of Economic Theory, 146, 2169{2205.
35
Lagos, Ricardo and Randall Wright, 2005, A unied framework for monetary theory and policy
analysis, Journal of political Economy, 113, 463{484.
Lagos, Ricardo, and Shengxing Zhang, 2014, Monetary Exchange in Over-the-Counter Markets:
A Theory of Speculative Bubbles, the Fed Model, and Self-fullling Liquidity Crises, working
paper.
Lester, Benjamin, Andrew Postlewaite, and Randall Wright, 2012, Information, Liquidity, Asset
Prices, and Monetary Policy, Review of Economic Studies, 79, 1209{1238.
Lester, Benjamin, Guillaume Rocheteau, and Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2014, Competing for order
ow in OTC markets, working paper.
Li, Yiting, Guillaume Rocheteau, and Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2012, Liquidity and the threat of
fraudulent assets, Journal of Political Economy, 120, 815{846.
Neklyudov, Artem, 2014, Bid-Ask Spreads and the Over-the-Counter Interdealer Markets: Core
and Peripheral Dealers, working paper.
Pagnotta, Emiliano and Thomas Philippon, 2013, Competing on speed, working paper.
Sidrauski, Miguel, 1967, Rational Choice and Patterns of Growth in a Monetary Economy,
A.E.R. Papers and Proceedings, 57, 534{44.
Shen, Ji, Bin Wei, and Hongjun Yan, 2015, Financial Intermediation Chains in an OTC Market,
working paper.
Trejos, Alberto and Randall Wright, 2014, Search-based models of money and nance: An
integrated approach, Journal of Economic Theory, forthcoming.
Vayanos, Dimitri, and Tan Wang, 2007, Search and Endogenous Concentration of Liquidity in
Asset Markets, Journal of Economic Theory, 66, 307{339.
Vayanos, Dimitri, and Pierre-Olivier Weill, 2008, A Search-Based Theory of the On-the-run
Phenomenon, Journal of Finance, 63, 1361{1398.
Vayanos, Dimitri, and Jean-Luc Vila, 2009, A Preferred-Habitat Model of the Term-Structure
of Interest Rates, working paper.
Weill, Pierre-Olivier, 2007, Leaning Against the Wind, Review of Economic Studies, 74, 1329{
1354.
Weill, Pierre-Olivier, 2008, Liquidity Premia in Dynamic Bargaining Markets, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 140, 66{96.
Williamson, Stephen, and Randall Wright, 2010, New Monetarist Economics: Methods, St.
Louis Federal Reserve Bank Review, 92, 265{302.
Williamson, Stephen, and Randall Wright, 2011, New Monetarist Economics: Models, in Hand-
book of Monetary Economics, vol. 3A, B. Friedman and M. Woodford, eds., Elsevier, 25{96.
Zhu, Haoxiang, 2012, Finding a Good Price in Opaque Over-the-Counter Markets, Review of
Financial Studies, 25 1255{1285.
36
